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ABSTRACT
Previous work has claimed that monopoly power facilitates the provision of credit, since
monopolists are better able to enforce payment. Here, we argue that if relationship-specific
investments are required by borrowers to establish creditworthiness, monopoly power may reduce
credit provision because hold up problems ex post will deter borrowers from investing in
establishing creditworthiness. Empirically, we examine the relationship between monopoly power
and credit provision, using data on the supply relationships of firms in five African countries.
Consistent with the upfront investment story, we find that monopoly power is negatively associated
with credit provision, and that this correlation is stronger in older supplier relationships. Because
the data include several observations per firm, we are able to utilize firm fixed-effects, thus netting
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  There exists a substantial economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
examining the relationship between competition and credit provision.  This body of 
research has generally conjectured a positive association between monopoly power and 
the provision of credit, because of a monopolist’s ability to enforce payment by 
threatening to cut off the supply of future credit or goods. By contrast, suppliers of credit 
in competitive markets will face difficulties in enforcing payment, since buyers may 
simply renege and move on to other creditors.  Petersen and Rajan (1997) use this 
argument in their study of supplier credit in the United States, and McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) also utilize this reasoning in looking at supplier credit relationships in 
Vietnam.
1  These conclusions, however, are potentially in conflict with claims that are 
often made by managers in developing economies about the actual provision of credit 
from suppliers.  For example, during a recent series of firm-level surveys in several Sub-
Saharan African countries, we asked owners and managers why they provided goods on 
credit.  A common response was that if a buyer were not provided with trade credit, he 
would threaten to make his purchases from an alternative supplier, suggesting that 
competition may increase a supplier’s willingness to provide credit.  
In this paper, we provide an economic explanation that captures the intuition, 
suggested above, that ex ante competition may encourage credit provision, because 
provision of credit is an effective means of preventing customer switching.  Our 
explanation is based on the observation that in many cases, effort must be exerted by the 
borrower in order to establish creditworthiness before any credit is provided.  Where such 
non-contractible, upfront investments are required, it is no longer clear that monopoly 
power increases credit provision, since the necessary investments will not be made if the 
                                                 
1 Closely related theories are used by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Bergstresser (2002) to argue for the 
benefits of monopoly power in banking markets.   3
buyer anticipates that all surplus will be extracted by the monopolist ex post.  Some 
bargaining power, through the threat of leaving the relationship, is required to induce the 
buyer to make the required initial investment.  At the same time, this upfront investment 
creates a switching cost for buyers, since the non-contractible investment must be made 
with every new supplier, hence diminishing the relative value of outside options.  This 
lock-in mitigates concerns of non-payment in competitive markets, thereby reducing the 
relative advantage of monopolists in supplying credit. 
In the empirical section that is the primary focus of this paper, we test for the effect 
of product market competition on the decision to provide trade credit using data from 
firms in five African countries.
2  We find a strong, robust, and positive relationship 
between supplier competition and credit provision in regressions that include firm fixed-
effects.  We provide some further evidence in support of the upfront investment model 
that we propose, with regressions showing that the higher likelihood of competitive firms 
obtaining credit occurs primarily in relationships that have existed for several years, and 
have therefore had time to allow for creditworthiness to be established. 
This paper is related to a number of literatures in economics.  Most obviously, we 
build on previous work in the area of relational contracting, which often uses trade credit 
access as a proxy for interfirm trust.  Recent significant contributions to this literature 
include Fafchamps (2000), and particularly McMillan and Woodruff (1999).  The results 
of this paper are also relevant for both the theoretical and empirical literatures on trade 
credit more generally (see Petersen and Rajan, 1997, for a recent survey).  Many papers 
in this area already consider the importance of relationship-building in leading to credit 
                                                 
2 Our paper examines the relationship between credit provision and product market competition for Sub-
Saharan African firms because of the fineness of the data available through the RPED survey.  One concern 
might be that this is a region where contracting is acutely difficult, and that our results would not hold in 
more moderate contracting environments.  We find evidence to the contrary, based on U.S. data: for the   4
provision, often by focusing on suppliers’ preferential access to information about their 
customers (see, for example, Biais and Gollier, 1997).  Finally, our research relates to the 
emerging literature on the effect of ownership concentration on the lending policies of 
banks, as in the work of Bergstresser (2002) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1, we elaborate on the 
intuition described in the introduction on why competition may increase credit provision.  
The data used in this paper are described in Section 2.  In Section 3, we provide our 
empirical results, as well as a discussion of potential omitted variable bias.  Finally, we 
conclude in Section 4 with some implications of our results. 
 
1.  Competition and Credit Provision: Theoretical Overview 
The risk of non-payment of supplier credit stems from two sources: default from firms 
that legitimately lack the financial resources to make payments, and the deliberate non-
payment by firms that hope to ‘steal’ the value of credit owing.  The latter difficulty may 
be mitigated by court-enforced contracts, and in their absence, implicit enforcement 
through the seller's threat of supply interruption.  The effectiveness of this threat, as noted 
by Peterson and Rajan (1997), is diminished if there are alternative suppliers of the good, 
since a ‘dishonest’ buyer may renege on payment, and subsequently switch to a new 
supplier (as long as there is not effective diffusion of information about defaults).  This is 
the traditional argument that leads to the prediction that monopolists will be more likely 
to provide credit, since they are better able to punish non-payment.
3 
                                                                                                                                                 
sample of  firms in the WorldScope database, we find that accounts receivable are negatively correlated 
with industry concentration.  Results available from the authors. 
3 Petersen and Rajan (1997) also note that if the buyer purchases only a relatively small percentage of the 
supplier’s output, then this will also increase the supplier’s ability to enforce repayment.   5
  The novel element that we introduce here is the idea that a buyer may need to exert 
effort to establish creditworthiness prior to the provision of credit.
4  This upfront effort 
may be necessary to mitigate risk of both deliberate and unintentional default. To the 
extent that honesty characterizes a buyer’s ‘type’ (honest versus dishonest) this upfront 
learning may attenuate concerns of deliberate default.   In addition, a buyer will be 
required to demonstrate that his finances are sound, to deal with concerns of default 
driven by poor future business prospects.  To the extent that the benefits generated by 
these investments only occur later (after the provision of credit begins), there will be a 
standard hold-up problem that discourages the initial investment.  These concerns will be 
particularly acute for buyers facing monopolistic suppliers, since the bargaining power 
accorded to monopolistic sellers will allow them to extract all ex post surplus.  
Recognizing this, the buyer will not make the upfront investments required to establish 
creditworthiness, and as a result, no credit will be given.  By contrast, under competition, 
the buyer has the possibility of starting a relationship with a new supplier.  This outside 
option allows the buyer to obtain a share of the generated surplus, and hence creates an 
incentive for the buyer to invest in establishing creditworthiness ex ante.   
Additionally, the relationship specificity of these investments creates a switching 
cost that also mitigates concerns of deliberate non-payment in competitive markets: a 
firm that reneges on credit payments must find a new supplier, and make its upfront 
investment in establishing creditworthiness once again.  Thus, in the spirit of Williamson 
(1971), this lock-in provides a supplier in an ex ante competitive market with enough 
market power ex post to prevent cheating by buyers.   
                                                 
4 Effort will also likely be required of the supplier.  This will only reinforce the advantage conferred on 
monopolists in credit provision, as sellers with monopoly power will be better positioned to recoup these 
upfront investments ex post due to greater bargaining power.  Since our focus is on the elements to credit 
provision that may generate the opposite relationship between monopoly power and credit, we concentrate 
on buyer investments.   6
To summarize, the need for buyer investments before credit is given 
simultaneously reduces demand for credit in monopolistic markets because of fear on the 
part of buyers of expropriation ex post, and increases the willingness of suppliers in 
competitive markets to provide goods on credit, because the lock-in generated by the 
relationship specificity of these investments creates switching costs that reduce concerns 
of non-payment.
5 
The preceding discussion is premised on the assumption that buyers must make 
upfront relationship-specific investments in order to establish their creditworthiness.  
While we did not collect data on supplier relationship-building specifically, there are 
anecdotal reports that are consistent with this assumption.  Prior to the provision of credit, 
buyers are required to solicit referrals, and open their accounts and operations to greater 
scrutiny so as to increase transparency.  Many of the firms that we interviewed did not 
keep any formal accounts at all: in this case, the only way that the credibility required for 
credit provision may be established is through relationship-building.  Furthermore, an 
additional element of lock-in may derive from the waiting period that is typically 
required for the buyer and seller to gain familiarity with one another, prior to the 
provision of credit.
6  Overall, this gradual establishment of credibility yields a corollary 
prediction.  Suppose that it is true that credit will only be provided in competitive markets 
after an initial period of learning.  Then among very young relationships, we should not 
see a higher rate of credit provision in more competitive industries.  The greater 
likelihood of obtaining credit should only occur in older relationships, where 
                                                 
5 In an extended version of this paper, we include a model of one-sided investment with the potential for 
nonpayment that formalizes the intuition discussed in this section.  This model is available from the 
authors, but is omitted here in the interests of space. 
6 This is consistent with the positive relationship between length of relationship and credit provision that 
we report below.  Also, it is consistent with several recent theoretical models in which, in the presence of 
‘non-cooperative types’, relationships are characterized by the gradual build-up of trust (see, for example,   7
creditworthiness and trust have been established.  In Section 4, we provide empirical 
results consistent with this ancillary prediction.
7   
    
2.  Data 
The data used in this paper come from surveys administered by the Regional Program on 
Enterprise Development (RPED) at the World Bank during 1992-95, to five former 
British colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe).  The firms were chosen to reflect a size-weighted representative sample, by 
industry, of the universe of firms in each country.   
While there are always concerns of data quality from surveys of this type, we 
believe that they are minimal with regard to the analyses in this paper.  Most importantly, 
errors generally arise from misreporting or mismeasurement of accounting data, such as 
sales; capital; expenses.  All critical regressions below do not require these data as 
controls, largely because of our fixed effects specifications.  In fact, almost all of our 
results are derived using only very simple, survey-based variables that are relatively 
straightforward for the survey respondents to estimate.  Deliberate misreporting, while 
often a concern, is unlikely to be driving our results.  First, the survey was carried out by 
an independent organization (i.e., without government affiliations), so there was less 
incentive for managers to mislead or withhold information.  Furthermore, it is unclear 
why misreporting would be systematically correlated with any of the variables that we 
use. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ghosh & Ray, 1996).  In the context of trading relationships, this suggests that the provision of credit will 
develop slowly, only as the supplier comes to learn more about the buyer and his ‘type’.   
7 We also note that the lock-in derived from credit relationships is likely to be intensified by adverse 
selection among firms searching for new suppliers, since suppliers will be more likely to allow lapses in 
relationships with firms that are poor credit risks to begin with.  This would similarly make it difficult for 
suppliers to try to lure buyers away from their competitors – presumably, ‘low-quality’ buyers would be the 
first to be let go by their current suppliers.   8
The data contain information on the firm's relationships with the primary supplier 
of each of its three most important inputs.  Thus, there are up to three observations per 
firm.  The form of payment was among the relationship-specific characteristics collected 
in the survey; virtually all relationships were characterized by credit or cash transactions, 
with a few reports of advance payment.  These data were used to construct the dummy 
variable CREDIT, which takes on a value of one if purchases with a particular supplier 
were largely credit based.  This will be the dependent variable in most of what follows. 
To proxy for the extent of product market competition, we utilize responses to the 
question, "Is this the only possible supplier available for this raw material or input?"  
These responses were used to construct the variable COMPETITION, which takes on a 
value of one if there is more than one supplier available to provide the materials 
purchased; this variable reflects whether the supplier has monopoly power. 
There are several relationship-level characteristics that may affect credit access and 
could be correlated with supplier market structure, and hence must be included as 
controls.  Particularly important is the length of relationship with the supplier: If, as 
suggested above, trust develops gradually, length of relationship will be an important 
determinant of credit provision.  We therefore include the reported length of the 
relationship with a given supplier in years (LENGTH) as a control.
8 
Frequency of interaction may also be an important predictor of credit access: 
frequent transactions will put a supplier in a better position to retaliate quickly for non-
payment, suggesting a positive relationship between credit provision and frequency of 
purchase.  From a demand perspective, there are two effects.  On the one hand, there may 
be less need for credit between parties that transact frequently, since making purchases in 
                                                 
8 In the simplest specification, including only COMPETITION and firm fixed effects, the coefficient on 
COMPETITION is only slightly smaller than in the results given below, and is still significant at the 1 
percent level.   9
small batches requires less capital; this argues for a negative relationship.  However, 
since credit may be most useful in lowering transactions costs (by aggregating bills) 
when purchases are frequent, more credit may be used in high frequency relationships.  
Overall, the predicted effect is ambiguous.  We define FREQUENCY as the frequency 
with which purchases were made from a given supplier.  These values range from daily 
(FREQUENCY =6) to yearly (FREQUENCY=0).
9 
Finally, there is a substantial literature relating social ties to credit provision.  In 
particular, Fafchamps (2000) has argued that ethnic networks may be an important 
determinant of credit provision.  To control for this effect, we included the variable 
ETHNIC, a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if both the firm and its supplier 
were Asian, or both were European.  This variable is not available for Ghanaian firms. 
   Since we will be using a firm fixed-affects specification in most regressions, firm-
level characteristics are of secondary importance.  However, for the purposes of 
comparison with previous work, we report some firm-level regressions and therefore 
require a number of additional covariates.  The primary concern in firm-level regressions 
is controlling for firm quality and reputation, which are surely correlated with credit 
access.  The proxies for reputation/quality that we use are the following: 
  
SIZE - Following on previous work using the RPED data, we use total employment, 
given by (full-time workers) + 0.5*(part-time workers), as a measure of firm size.   
OVERDRAFT- dummy variable; takes on a value of one if the firm has access to 
overdraft facilities.   
AGE – firm’s age.  
                                                 
9 Firms were given the option of responding that the frequency of interaction was “Occasional” – we omit 
observations where this rather non-specific response was given in regressions involving the variable 
FREQUENCY.   10
Additional controls that are commonly employed include ethnicity and gender 
dummies; hence, we include the following: 
ASIAN – dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm’s owner is of Asian 
descent.  This variable is not available for Ghanaian firms. 
EURO – dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm’s owner is of European 
descent.  This variable is not available for Ghanaian firms. 
GENDER – dummy variable equal to one if the firm's owner is female.  
Finally, since subsidiaries of larger firms may obtain goods on credit from their 
parent companies, or may have the parent company act as guarantor, we include 
SUBSIDIARY, a dummy variable denoting whether the firm is a subsidiary of a 
conglomerate.  A summary of all data definitions is given in the Data Appendix. 
  Industry-country dummies are also included in the random effects regressions.  
There are four broad industries covered by the survey: Food Processing; Textiles and 
Clothing; Wood and Furniture; and Metal Products.  Since our sample contains five 
countries, this yields a total of nineteen dummy variables. 
The original sample included data on 1045 firms; of these, 19 did not report any 
information on their supplier relationships, and were thus dropped from the sample.  The 
remaining 1026 firms included data on a total of 2494 supplier relationships.  
Relationship-level observations were dropped where information on the length of the 
relationship (174) or the competitiveness of the supplier market (9) was missing (number 
of observations dropped in parentheses; deletions done sequentially). This yielded a 
sample of 960 firms with 2311 relationships.  For the random effects regressions, SIZE 
was not available for some firms, thereby reducing the sample in these regressions to 
2202 observations. Basic summary statistics for the firms are listed in Table 1a.   11
Firms for which there is no variation in credit access are problematic for within-
firm binary choice regressions.  We follow Chamberlain (1986), in running conditional 
logit regressions, which automatically excludes firms without variation in CREDIT.  
Thus, these regressions are limited to a subsample of observations consisting of 188 firms 
with 527 relationships.  Summary statistics of this smaller sample are listed in Table 1b. 
  
3.  Results 
In the analyses that follow, we utilize two different models: random effects logit, and 
conditional fixed effects logit (as developed by Chamberlain, 1980).  As already 
mentioned above, the sample size will be considerably smaller for the fixed effects 
specifications. 
 
Random Effects Model 
As always, there are concerns that the random effect will be correlated with some 
relationship-level characteristics that reflect firm quality.  We include standard firm-level 
controls (described above in the data section), and also the means of our relationship-
level variables, as suggested by Chamberlain (1984).  This leads to the following 
specification: 
 
P(CREDITsi = 1) =  Λ(β 1*LENGTHsi + β 2*COMPETITIONsi + β 3*LENGTHsi*COMPETITIONsi 
+ β 4*FREQUENCYsi + β 5*ETHNICsi + β 6* avg(LENGTH)i+ β 7*avg(COMPETITION)i  
+ β 8* avg(FREQUENCY)i + β 9*avg(ETHNIC)i + β 10*log(SIZEi) +  β 11*OVERDRAFTi,  
+ β 12*AGE i, + β 13*EUROi, + β 13*ASIANi, + INDUSTRYi, + COUNTRYi + ηi + εsi) 
   12
where i is a firm index and s is a relationship index; INDUSTRYi is a vector of industry 
dummies and COUNTRYi is a vector of country dummies; Λ(.) is the logistic function; ηi 
is a firm-specific random effect, and εsi is the error term. 
Table 2 lists the results.  The coefficient on the variable of primary interest, 
COMPETITION, is positive, and generally significant at the 5 percent.  The coefficient’s 
size, 0.9, implies that for a firm with ‘average’ characteristics, the probability of 
obtaining credit increases from 40 to 60 percent in switching from a monopolistic to a 
competitive supplier market, holding buyer characteristics constant.  This is an 
economically large effect; based on a comparison with the coefficient on LENGTH, the 
effect of COMPETITION is analogous to the difference in credit access between a new 
relationship and a relationship that has existed for more than 20 years already.  By 
contrast, the coefficient on avg(COMPETITION) is never significant, and does not have a 
consistent sign across regressions.
10 
In the previous discussion, we also claimed that lock-in should lead to greater 
provision of credit in competitive markets only after an initial period during which 
creditworthiness is established.  A prediction stemming from this observation is that 
competition should matter more among older relationships, i.e., we expect that the 
coefficient on the interaction term LENGTH*COMPETITION should be positive. Results 
in support of this prediction are listed in column (5).  The coefficient on the uninteracted 
COMPETITION term is only slightly greater than zero, implying that for new 
                                                 
10  There are numerous reasons that could account for this relating to unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms, which highlights the importance of having within-firm variation. For example, firms in more densely 
packed industrial areas may be more likely to have competitive suppliers.  Such areas may also have more 
effective legal enforcement or informational diffusion mechanisms leading to implicit enforcement, both of 
which could facilitate the provision of credit.  Conversely, firms with monopolistic suppliers may be in 
isolated areas, where enforcement is easier due to the relatively small size of the business community.  
Hence the ambiguous observed relationship between avg(COMPETITION) and CREDIT.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, if the data are collapsed into a single observation per firm, and the regressions run 
using a simple cross-section with avg(CREDIT) as the dependent variable, the effect of competition appears 
to be insignificant.   13
relationships (i.e., LENGTH = 0), the probability of obtaining credit is virtually identical 
for both competitive and monopolistic suppliers. 
The other coefficients in Table 2 are, for the most part, as expected.  Among the 
relationship specific variables: the coefficient on LENGTH is positive and generally 
significant, consistent with the idea that there is a gradual build-up of trust that precedes 
the provision of credit.  In the regressions that include FREQUENCY, its coefficient is 
positive and marginally significant, while the coefficient on avg(FREQUENCY) is 
negative. One interpretation of these results is the following: frequent interaction makes it 
easier to punish non-payment, and should thus promote the provision of credit, hence the 
positive coefficient on FREQUENCY.  On the other hand, firms that interact frequently 
with their suppliers are more likely to be credit constrained, and hence poor credit risks 
(thus the negative coefficient on avg(FREQUENCY)). The coefficient on ETHNIC, which 
directly measures the presence of ethnic supplier ties, is positive and marginally 
significant.   For the firm-level variables, firm size, a good proxy for a company’s 
reliability and reputation, is large and significant.  The coefficient on OVERDRAFT is 
also positive and strongly significant.  While it might be tempting to interpret this as 
representing a complementarity between formal (bank) and informal (trade credit) 
financing, this would not be appropriate – access to overdraft facilities is probably a 
signal of (unobserved) firm quality, which might also account for a firm’s trade credit 
access.  AGE is relatively small in size and significance, which is surprising given that 
the age of an establishment should be a reasonably good proxy for its reliability in 
repaying its debts (though perhaps it does not add any information after controlling for 
LENGTH).  Finally, consistent with previous work in this area, the coefficients on the 
two ethnicity dummies are also positive, and the Asian dummy is significant (see, for 
example, Fafchamps, 2000).  While this has often been interpreted as resulting from   14
ethnic networks that facilitate contract enforcement, it may also be driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity across ethnic groups (see Fisman, 2003). 
 
Fixed Effects Model 
All of the preceding regressions were repeated using Chamberlain's (1980) conditional 
fixed-effects model.  Because the maximum likelihood estimation in this case is 
conditional on the total number of suppliers from which a firm receives goods on credit, 
all observations for which there is no within firm variation in CREDIT drop out of the 
maximum likelihood expression.  This reduces the sample size to 188 firms with 527 
relationships).  Our fixed-effects specification is as follows: 
 
P(CREDITsi = 1) =  Λ(β 1*LENGTHsi + β 2*COMPETITIONsi + β 3*LENGTHsi*COMPETITIONsi 
            + β 4*FREQUENCYsi, + β 5*ETHNICsi + αi)     
 
The results are listed in Table 3; the coefficients are very similar to those obtained with 
the random effects model, suggesting that the firm-level controls do a reasonable job of 
controlling for unobserved quality as it may be correlated with relationship-level 
regressors.  The coefficient on COMPETITION is again positive, and significant at 1 
percent in the basic regression; its size is unaffected by the inclusion of additional 
controls, though it significance diminishes somewhat as the sample size is reduced.
11  
Note that the size of the coefficient on COMPETITION is very similar to its size in the 
random effects regressions.  Similarly, the interaction term LENGTH*COMPETITION is 
of comparable (though marginal smaller) magnitude, though it is no longer significant at 
                                                 
11 To the extent that the coefficient changes across specifications, this is actually due to changes in the 
sample, rather than the inclusion of additional controls.   15
conventional levels.  The other coefficients are also very similar to their counterparts in 
the random effects regressions. 
 
Robustness 
There are two basic concerns regarding the robustness of our results: the omission of 
supplier characteristics correlated with supplier competition; and alternative explanations 
for the positive relationship between COMPETITION and CREDIT.  Below, we provide a 
brief discussion of each of these issues. 
The major concern of omitted variable bias results from the lack of control for 
supplier size, which would almost certainly be correlated with the decision to provide 
credit, and also competition.  However, the omission of this variable most likely biases 
our results towards zero, since monopolists are probably larger firms, and larger firms are 
probably more likely to grant credit.  We may examine this possibility to a limited degree 
with the available data, since it gives us the rank ordering of the value of purchases from 
each of the three suppliers.  We define SUPPLIER SIZE as this rank ordering (i.e., 
SUPPLIER SIZE = 1 for the most important supplier; etc.). Assuming that suppliers that 
provide a larger volume of inputs are larger firms, adding this variable should be a proxy 
for supplier size. When SUPPLIER SIZE is included as a regressor, its coefficient is of 
the predicted sign and very significant; once supplier size is controlled for in this 
admittedly imprecise manner, the coefficient on COMPETITION increases (to about 
0.95).
12 
                                                 
12 Another concern may be heterogeneity across countries.  In particular, there are vast differences in key 
variables, specifically access to credit, which goes from 0.08 (Tanzania) to almost 0.7 (Zimbabwe).  To 
ensure that no particular country is driving our result, we repeated our analyses for each country 
individually.  The coefficient on COMPETITION was positive in all countries (except Tanzania, where 
there were insufficient observations to calculate standard errors ), taking on values from 0.16 to 0.95. We 
cannot reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients, though any test of such a hypothesis is statistically very 
weak.   16
The principal alternative explanation for the positive correlation between 
COMPETITION  and CREDIT requires that we depart from the standard profit-
maximizing view of the firm.  In particular, it involves the assumption that the investment 
necessary for credit provision requires effort on the part of the supplier, and that 
monopolists prefer the ‘quiet life’ and therefore do not exert this effort.  While this is 
certainly plausible, we do not find any evidence in our data to suggest that monopolists 
fail to exert costly effort along other dimensions.  For example, using data on product 
market competition, we find that greater competition is negatively correlated with both 
investment and advertising as a fraction of total sales, though these correlations are not 
significant.  To the extent that these are also costly investments required to generate 
future profits, it is at least suggestive that firms in less competitive markets are not opting 
for the quiet life. 
 
Relation to earlier literature 
Our results apparently contradict those of McMillan and Woodruff (2000), who examine 
the determinants of credit access in Vietnam.  They report that in their sample, there is 
greater provision of credit for firms that would have trouble finding alternative suppliers, 
i.e., firms whose suppliers do not face competition.  This discrepancy may further 
highlight the value of having within-firm variation.  Note that in some specifications, the 
random effects regressions produce a negative sign on avg(COMPETITION), i.e., firms 
that are generally in competitive environments are less likely to obtain credit.  This is a 
firm-level (as opposed to relationship-level) effect that would be a part of McMillan and 
Woodruff's measure of competition.  If it were to dominate the competitive-relationship 
effect, this could account for the difference in results.   17
  Our results also contrast with those of Petersen and Rajan (1995).  The basic 
difference is that their data come from the U.S., where formal financial institutions are far 
more prevalent than in sub-Saharan Africa.  Also, with active credit rating agencies, 
information on credit histories would be readily available.  In other words, one would not 
expect credit to be a primary means of locking in customers in the markets studied by 
Petersen and Rajan. Also, there is the fact that the Peterson and Rajan are looking at 
lending institutions, so credit is not the hook to obtain and keep customers for some other 
product.  Rather, credit is the product, so it is peculiar to think about any distinction 
between price competition and credit competition in this context.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
Previous work on credit provision has claimed that monopoly power facilitates the 
provision of credit, since monopolists are better able to capture the surplus resulting from 
credit relationships.  In this paper we argue that if relationship-specific investments are 
required by the borrower to establish creditworthiness before any credit is provided, 
monopolists may provide less credit, since hold up problems ex post will deter borrowers 
from investing in establishing creditworthiness.  Consistent with the upfront investment 
story, we find that monopoly power is negatively associated with credit provision, and 
that this correlation is stronger in older supplier relationships. 
  Note, however, that the welfare and policy implications of the development of 
credit relationships are not entirely clear.  We have argued that the primary reason that 
competition may promote credit provision is that it permits firms in competitive markets 
to gain some degree of market power over their customers.  To the extent that this allows 
a firm to extract rents through monopoly pricing, some of the benefits of competition 
may be attenuated.  In more developed countries, this problem of credit ‘lock in’ is   18
mitigated by the existence of credit rating agencies that track companies’ credit histories.  
Such organizations are only beginning to emerge in the less developed economies from 
which we draw our data.  Our results suggest that the development of such institutions 
could be a tremendous boon for buyers – if the flow of information required for credit 
provision could be provided for general (rather than relationship-specific) use, firms 
might obtain credit from a broader set of suppliers, and at the same time diminishing the 




CREDIT – dummy variable denoting whether purchases with a particular supplier were 
largely credit based.   
COMPETITION – dummy variable denoting whether there is more than one supplier 
available to provide the materials purchased. 
LENGTH – the reported length of the relationship with a given supplier, in years.   
FREQUENCY – the frequency with which purchases were made from a given supplier.  
These values range from daily (FREQUENCY =6) to yearly (FREQUENCY=0).   
ETHNIC – dummy variable that takes on a value of one if both the firm and its supplier 
were Asian, or both were European.  
 
Firm Variables 
SIZE - total firm employment, given by (full-time workers) + 0.5*(part-time workers).   
OVERDRAFT- dummy variable denoting whether the firm has access to overdraft 
facilities.   
AGE – firm’s age.  
ASIAN – dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm’s owner is of Asian 
descent.   
EURO – dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm’s owner is of European 
descent.   
GENDER – dummy variable equal to one if the firm's owner is female.   
SUBSIDIARY –  dummy variable denoting whether the firm is a subsidiary of a 
conglomerate.     20
                                                          
References 
 
 Bergstresser, Daniel. “Market concentration and commercial bank loan portfolios.” 
manuscript, Harvard Business School, 2002. 
 
Biais, Bruno and Christian Gollier. “Trade Credit and Credit Rationing.” Review of 
Financial Studies, 10 (4), Winter 1997, pp. 903-937. 
 
Chamberlain, Gary.  "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data."  Review of 
Economic Studies, 47, 1980, pp. 225-238. 
 
Chamberlain, Gary.  "Panel Data."  Handbook of Econometrics, Volume II, Zvi Griliches 
and Michael D. Intriligator (eds.).  New York: North-Holland, 1984, pp. 1248-
1318. 
 
Greene, William H. Econometric Analysis, 4th edition, Prentice-Hall: New Jersey, 2000. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel.  "Trade Credit in Zimbabwean Manufacturing."  World 
Development, 25 (5), July 1997, pp. 795-815. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel.  "Ethnicity and Credit in African Manufacturing."  Journal of 
Development Economics, 61(1), February 2000, 205-35. 
 
Fisman, Raymond J.,  “Ethnic Ties and the Provision of Credit: Relationship-level 
Evidence from African Firms" Berkeley Economics Journal: Advances in the 
Economics and Growth of Developing Areas, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, 2003, 
http://www.bepress.com/bejegda/advances/vol1/iss1/art1. 
 
Ghosh, Parikshit and Debraj Ray.  "Cooperation in Community Interaction without 
Information Flows."  Review of Economics Studies, 63 (3), July 1996, pp. 491-519. 
 
MacMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff. “Interfirm Relationshipss and Informal 
Credit in Vietnam.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), November 1999, pp. 
1285-1320. 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan.  "The Effect of Credit Market 
Competition on Lending Relationships."  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (2), 
May 1995, pp. 407-43. 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan.  “Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence.” 
Review of Financial Studies, 10(3), Fall 1997, pp. 661-691. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations,” American Economic Review, May 1971, 61, 112-23.   21
Table 1a:  Summary Statistics 
 
 Full 
Sample Ghana Kenya Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
Firm Variables         
Size 122  63.36  87.1  98.9 82.31  271.72 
  (940) (143) (205)  (207) (197)  (188) 
AGE  17.93 15.23 17.94  14.99 17.66  23.36 
  (959) (145) (210)  (208) (201)  (195) 
OVERDRAFT  0.46 0.25 0.63  0.25 0.46  0.69 
  (954) (144) (209)  (208) (202)  (191) 
SUBSIDIARY  0.03 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.1 
  (960) (145) (210)  (208) (202)  (195) 
ASIAN 0.3    0.53  0.24 0.27  0.13 
 (703)    (194)  (165) (173)  (171) 
EURO 0.15    0.01  0 0.13  0.47 
 (703)    (194)  (165) (173)  (171) 
GENDER  0.87 0.76 0.92  0.94 0.89  0.81 
  (751) (119) (183)  (162) (156)  (131) 
Relationship Variables         
CREDIT 0.32  0.32  0.4  0.08 0.16  0.63 
  (2311) (306) (447)  (492) (525)  (541) 
LENGTH 10.23  6.5  8.38  8.84 9.45  15.87 
  (2311) (306) (447)  (492) (525)  (541) 
COMPETITION  0.83 0.94 0.87  0.83 0.8  0.78 
  (2311) (306) (447)  (492) (525)  (541) 
ETHNIC 0.08    0.14  0.05 0.04  0.11 
 (1478)    (338)  (385) (447)  (308) 
FREQUENCY  2.38 2.23 1.99  2.76 2.56  2.34 
  (1903) (177) (431)  (379) (431)  (485) 
 
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses.  For variables definitions, please see 
Appendix.   22
 
 
Table 1b - Summary Statistics with Sample Restricted to Firms with Variation in CREDIT 
 
 Full 
Sample Ghana Kenya Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe 
Firm Variables      
Size 254.87  101.86 133.73 516.61 164.02  482.81 
 (188)  (43) (31) (14) (47)  (48) 
AGE 22.41  17.44 17.53 23 25.74  26.72 
 (188)  (45) (32) (14) (47)  (50) 
OVERDRAFT 0.66  0.32 0.88 0.71 0.74  0.72 
 (187)  (44) (32) (14) (47)  (50) 
SUBSIDIARY 0.04  0 0.03 0 0.02  0.1 
 (188)  (45) (32) (14) (47)  (50) 
ASIAN 0.36    0.66 0.63 0.44  0.05 
 (111)    (29) (8) (32)  (42) 
EURO 0.27    0.03 0 0.19  0.55 
 (111)    (29) (8) (32)  (42) 
GENDER 0.84  0.74 0.96 1 0.88  0.76 
 (123)  (35) (27) (7) (25)  (29) 
Relationship Variables       
CREDIT 0.5  0.47 0.49 0.5 0.45  0.57 
 (527)  (120) (86) (40) (135)  (146) 
LENGTH 11.03  5.86 7.87 9.93 10.27  18.29 
 (527)  (120) (86) (40) (135)  (146) 
COMPETITION 0.84  0.96 0.83 0.88 0.91  0.67 
 (527)  (120) (86) (40) (135)  (146) 
ETHNIC 0.07    0.1 0 0.05  0.1 
 (254)    (59) (24) (91)  (80) 
FREQUENCY 2.5  2.08 2.23 2.86 2.93  2.42 
 (466)  (81) (86) (37) (124)  (138) 
 
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses.  For variables definitions, please see 
Appendix.   23
Table 2: Access to Supplier Credit, Cross-sectional Logit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
LENGTH  0.040 0.030 0.047 0.032 0.005 
(0.17) (0.017)  (0.026) (0.032 (0.02) 
     
COMPETITION  0.946 0.920 1.216 1.292 0.234 
(0.337) (0.346) (0.507) (0.562)  (0.47) 
     
FREQUENCY    0.160 0.237 0.255 0.046 
  (0.092) (0.133) (0.155)  (0.02) 
     
ETHNIC     1.19  1.217   
   (0.738)  (0.770)  
     
Log(SIZE)  0.777 0.699 0.901 0.460 0.793 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.152) (0.188) (0.094) 
     
AGE      0.020   
    (0.022)   
     
avg  (LENGTH)  -0026 0.0004 -0.025 -0.031 -0.024 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.036) (0.045) (0.023) 
       
avg (COMPETITION)  0.004  0.048  -1.032  -0.809  0.15 
  (0.561) (0.579) (0.785) (0.868) (0.563) 
       
avg  (FREQUENCY)    -0.236 -0.360 -0.297   
    (0.138) (0.200) (0.226)   
       
avg  (ETHNIC)     0.867  0.315  
     (1.01)  (1.027)   
       
SUBSIDIARY      -0.107   
    (2.97)   
     
OVERDRAFT      0.870   
    (0.525)   
     
GENDER      1.695   
    (0.817)   
     
ASIAN      1.720   
    (0.585)   
     
EURO      0.986   
    (0.822)   
     
LENGTH*       0.046 
        COMPETITION          (0.02) 
     
Chi2  172.75  150.27 92.99  74.31 171.23 
Log  Likelihood  -933.37 -811.04 -439.21 -357.66 -931.12 
Obs.  2202 1817 1177 1022 2202 
        
Notes: Standard Errors in Parentheses.  All regressions have industry-country fixed 
effects.  Please see Appendix for variable definitions.   24
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of Credit Acess Firm Fixed Effects Logistic Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: CREDIT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
LENGTH  0.036 0.029 0.040 0.040 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
      
COMPETITION 0.863 0.729 0.852 0.852 
  (0.319) (0.322) (0.465) (0.465)
      
FREQUENCY   0.120  0.165  
   (0.083)  (0.123)  
      
ETHNIC     0.847  
     (0.651)  
      
LENGTH*      0.036 
   COMPETITION        (0.024)
      
Chi2  11.73 10.28 10.64 14.14 
Log  likelihood  -185.67  -159.17 -78.57 -184.47 
Obs.  527 452 231 527 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Please see Appendix for variable definitions. 
 